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1. Introduction 
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• Economic theory suggests that discrimination is price 
sensitive and money an equalizer 
• This means that discrimination decreases the higher 
the private costs for the discriminator 
• Economic reasoning: Discrimination comes at a price 
for the discriminator 
 Example: an employer discriminates against potential employees 
with a non-white skin tone and thus may miss the best employees 
who then work for a competitor. 
 Imperfect competition leads to rents and rents can be used to 
discriminate and they can be discrimination in itself. [Jomo, 2003]. 
 Competition reduces discrimination 
 Is money an equalizer? And by how much? 
University of Hamburg 
Institute of Law & Economics 
Forms of Discrimination [Bertrand et al. 
2005 and Parsons et al 2011] 
• Taste-based discrimination: Discriminating against a 
person or group for personal reasons 
• Statistical discrimination: Discriminating because the 
membership of a certain group provides information about 
a relevant characteristic 
• Implicit discrimination: Unintentional and outside of the 
discriminator’s awareness 
• Positive Discrimination: Being disproportionately likely to 
engage with a member of a certain group given the 
prevalence of members of this group 
• Negative Discrimination: Being less likely to engage with a 
member of a certain group given its prevalence 
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Brief Outline of Research Idea 
• Analyzing whether poker players from a certain country 
are  
 significantly more likely to play against people from a certain 
country (positive discrimination) 
 significantly less likely to play against people from a certain country 
(negative discrimination) 
• Control if and by how much the discrimination vanishes 
when stakes increase  
 Main hypothesis A: Positive discrimination decreases with 
increasing stakes. 
 Main hypothesis B: Negative discrimination decreases with 
increasing stakes. 
 Determining the price elasticity of discrimination  
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Data: Online Poker Database of the 
University of Hamburg (OPD-UHH) 
• Database includes (inter alia): 
 data on 4.6 million poker player identities over 6 months 
 information on origin of players  
 information on limits played (stakes) 
 Data collected 2009/2010 (before Black Friday) 
 10 minutes between data points 
• Data used: Dataset used by other studies  
 poker market size [Fiedler/Wilcke 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 
2011d, 2011e, 2012; Philander/Fiedler 2012] 
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Data used 
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• One week of No Limit Heads up tables at Full Tilt 
Poker for stakes NL50 to NL20,000  
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Steps of the Data Analysis 
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Definition of Variables, Symmetric 
Differences 
• Frequencies of player observations from different 
countries relative to all observations 
• Expected absolute number of observations for each 
country pair 
• Expected frequency of a country pair relative to all 
observations 
• Ratio between the observed and expected observations of 
a country pair 
• The difference between the observed and the expected 
observations of a country pair and its relative complement 
These figures show which country pairings are observed 
more often or less often than expected 
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Definition of Variables, Non-Symmetric 
Differences 
• Observed frequency of a country pair relative to a country 
i (and not relative to all observations) 
 
• Expected frequency of a country pair relative to a country i 
(Please note that this figure is different for the same player 
pair depending on which country is country i) 
 
• Difference between the observed relative frequency of a 
country pair and its expected relative frequency relative to 
a country 
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Controlling for Time Differences 
• Time differences between countries make it more or less 
likely to encounter players from the other country at the 
tables 
• Interpretation of time differences:  
 bonus on the probability of playing against players from countries 
which have zero or little time difference  
 discount on the probability of playing against players from countries 
which have a high time difference 
• Capturing time difffernces 
 Grouping countries with identical time differences 
 Determining effects via a regression on dummies  
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Results #1: Positive Discrimination was 
found 
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• No significant negative discrimination was found 
• Significant positive discrimination was found in the so 
called hom-bias (players from country A are more 
likely to play against other people from country A) 
• Result of Wilcoxon signe.d-rank test: 
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Results #2: Positive Discrimination 
decreases in stakes 
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Interpretation #1 
• People are willing to pay a premium to play with other 
players from their country 
• That is remarkable because the online poker environment 
is purely virtual 
• Is it because of the possibility of chatting in the same 
language? 
 Rather not, because: 
o people chat very rarely in online poker and  
o all languages except English are prohibited (words in foreign 
languages are made unrecognizable) 
 Also: Wilcoxon signed-rank test without English speaking countries 
found the same result (and not a stronger one) 
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Interpretation #2 
• Players on the higher limits are not willing to pay the 
(higher) price for the good „discrimination“ 
  
 Demand for discrimination decreases with an 
increasing price  
Money is an equalizer in this setting 
 
• Further analysis reveaeld a price elasticity of demand for 
discrimination of -0.25 (very inelastic) 
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Limitations 
• Cases of country pairs with zero observations were 
excluded 
• Stickiness/status-quo bias: players are more likely to stick 
to a table they are already sitting at than to switch tables 
during the phase of ten minutes 
• Transfer of the results from empirical analysis to the 
estimate of a demand curve is limited 
 too few data points/limits where a significant home bias is observed 
 depends on the assumption that the price is increasing 
proportionally with stakes 
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Thank you for your kind attention! 
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